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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS
- POLICE POWER - 1980 DIVORCE CODE - The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has held that a retroactive application of the equita-
ble distribution provisions of the 1980 Pennsylvania Divorce Code
is permissible and not violative of the United States or Pennsylva-
nia constitutions.
Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982).
Vincent Louis Bacchetta filed for divorce in October, 1979.' At
the time, Pennsylvania was on the verge of enacting a new Divorce
Code2 which radically altered the existing procedures for dissolu-
tion of marriages.' Pursuant to the new Code,4 Bacchetta's wife,
Lena Troiani, filed an application that the case be heard under the
new legislation, which was granted.' She then filed a claim for ali-
mony and equitable distribution of the marital property, pursuant
1. Brief for Appellee at 2, Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.3d 1194 (1982).
The proceeding below was heard at No. 427 October Term, 1979, in the Court of Common
Pleas of Chester County.
2. Act of Apr. 2, 1980, P.L. 63, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-801 (Purdon Supp.
1982-1983).
3. See Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa. Super. 491, 507, 439 A.2d 683, 691 (1981). The new
Code "represents a drastic, and dramatic, repudiation by the legislature of the philosophy of
the Divorce Law of 1929." Id. See also Lippincott, Highlights of Pennsylvania's New No-
Fault Divorce Law, 51 PA. B.A.Q. 185, 186 (1980).
4. Section 103 of the Code provides:
The provisions of this act shall not affect any suits or action pending, but the
same may be proceeded with and concluded either under the laws in existence when
such suit or action was instituted, notwithstanding the repeal of such laws by this act,
or, upon application granted, under the provisions of this act ...
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 103 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
5. 498 Pa. 229-30, 445 A.2d at 1195.
6. Brief for Appellant at 3. Marital property is defined by the Code as:
[Al property acquired by either party during the marriage except-
(1) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the mar-
riage except for the increase in value during the marriage.
(2) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered into
before, during or after the marriage.
(3) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent except for the
increase in value during the marriage.
(4) Property acquired after separation until the date of divorce, provided
however, if the parties separate and reconcile, all property acquired subsequent
to the final separation until their divorce.
(5) Property which a party has sold, granted, conveyed or otherwise dis-
posed of in good faith and for value prior to the time proceedings for the di-
vorce are commenced.
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to the procedure set forth in the Code.'
The Chester County Court of Common Pleas entered a decree
dissolving the twenty-six year marriage.' The trial court held that
the Code's new provisions concerning equitable distribution of
property applied to that property falling under the Code's defini-
tion of marital property, but held further that, pursuant to Willcox
v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co.,9 any application of the provi-
sion to property acquired before the effective date of the new Di-
vorce Code would be unconstitutional. 10
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed plenary jurisdiction
of the case upon application of the wife." The court, in an opinion
by Justice Roberts, 2 affirmed the lower court's determination that
the 1980 Divorce Code specifically provides that all actions gov-
erned by the Code will be decided using all the provisions of the
Code, deeming property acquired before its effective date within
the statutory definition of marital property. 8
The court dismissed the husband's contention that, while gov-
erned by the Code, the definition and distribution of marital prop-
erty should only be applicable to property obtained after the
Code's effective date.'4 The court commented that the stated pur-
pose of the Code1" was to bring the law more in line with the social
(6) Veterans benefits exempt from attachment, levy or seizure....
(7) Property to the extent to which such property has been mortgaged or
otherwise encumbered in good faith for value, prior to the time proceedings for
the divorce are commenced.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
7. The Code specifies that the court is directed to distribute the marital property "in
such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors," including
ten that are enumerated. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See
infra note 32 and accompanying text.
8. Bacchetta v. Bacchetta, No. 427 (C.P. Chester County, Pa., Apr. 23, 1981), rev'd,
498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982).
9. 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947). Willcox concerned the Community Property Law
of 1947, No. 550, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423, which dealt with a spouse's property during marriage
in much the same way the equitable distribution provisions of the new Divorce Code deal
with property upon divorce. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text.
10. 498 Pa. at 231, 445 A.2d at 1196.
11. Id. at 229, 445 A.2d at 1195. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(7) (Purdon 1981).
12. Chief Justice O'Brien, and Justices Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott,
and Hutchinson heard the case. Justice Nix filed a dissenting opinion and Justice Flaherty
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Larsen joined. 498 Pa. at 228-29, 445 A.2d at
1194-95.
13. Id., at 230, 445 A.2d at 1195.
14. Id. at 1195-96, 445 A.2d at 1195-96.
15. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of
the family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the
1138
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and economic realities of divorce. 16 The court found no basis in the
Code for applying its marital property provisions solely to property
acquired after the statute's effective date17 in light of the fact that
the Divorce Code itself exempts certain property from the defini-
tion and omits an exemption for property acquired before the
Code's effective date.18 In response to this notion, Justice Roberts
determined that it would be unreasonable and unmanageable not
to apply the marital property provisions to all property regardless
of when it was acquired - unmanageable in that it would burden
the courts and the litigants, demanding that these parties deter-
mine exactly when all of the property was acquired, and unreason-
able in that the benefits of the Code were intended by the legisla-
ture for all parties to a divorce in the state and such an application
would delay those benefits for a generation at the very least.' 9
Justice Roberts decided that the trial court's decision was incor-
rect as far as it determined that a retroactive application of the
statute to pre-Code-acquired property would be unconstitutional
pursuant to the supreme court's decision in Willcox. He noted,
that, in Willcox, the Community Property Law of 194720 was
designed primarily to bestow a tax break on Pennsylvania couples
much like that enjoyed in other jurisdictions with community
property laws.2 ' The Community Property Law of 1947 immedi-
ately gave an undivided one-half interest to a spouse in property
acquired after the statute's effective date and after the marriage,
and in earnings from property acquired before the law's effective
policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to:
(1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the
realities of matrimonial experience.
(4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal disso-
lution of the marriage.
(6) Effectuate economic justice between the parties who are divorced ....
Id.
16. 498 Pa. at 231, 445 A.2d at 1196.
17. Id. at 230, 445 A.2d at 1195-96. The effective date of the code was July 1, 1980. PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
18. 498 Pa. at 230, 445 A.2d at 1196.
19. Id. at 231, 445 A.2d at 1196.
20. No. 550, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423. Willcox held unconstitutional the Community Prop-
erty Law of 1947 which contained provisions exceedingly similar in operation to the equita-
ble distribution provisions of the code as applied here. See infra notes 106-28 and accompa-
nying text.
21. 498 Pa. at 231-32, 445 A.2d at 1196.
1983 1139
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date.2  The Willcox court held that retroactive application would
be a deprivation of property forbidden by the constitutions of
Pennsylvania and the United States.23 The Bacchetta court distin-
guished Willcox, stating that while the Community Property Law
of 1947 was designed to provide tax relief, the new Divorce Code
was enacted to provide an equitable and effective remedy for the
non-working spouse in a marriage which fails.2 ' The legislature,
wrote Justice Roberts, has a broad control over marriage and its
requirements, and an interest in regulating those requirements for
the general good of society."
Turning to the problem at hand, Justice Roberts commented
that the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in certain
cases, that the state's police power permitted the dissolution of
vested property rights. He specifically noted that the right of the
22. See Willcox v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 584, 55 A.2d 521, 523
(1947).
23. Id. at 590-91, 55 A.2d at 526.
24. 498 Pa. at 232, 445 A.2d at 1197. The court stated:
Prior to the enactment of the Divorce Code in many marriages, a nonworking spouse
contributed years of service to the family, but did not realize any significant economic
gain. Thus, upon divorce, nonworking spouses, who frequently had no marketable
skills, were left with few, if any assets of their own and faced the risk of becoming
public charges .... [T]he Divorce Code permits the correction of the economic injus-
tices which often arose under former law ....
Id.
The Willcox court, however, offered this same thought:
[I]t being recognized that, while the husband is usually the breadwinner, the wife, by
her management of the household and rearing of the children, makes it possible for
the husband to devote himself more freely to his income-producing activities; this
justifies the pooling of their resources thus derived from what is essentially a common
enterprise.
357 Pa. at 593, 55 A.2d at 527.
25. 498 Pa. at 232-33, 445 A.2d at 1197. Both the Bacchetta and Willcox courts cited
Justice Field's opinion in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), as support for the divergent
conclusions reached. The excerpt cited provides:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been
subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which parties
may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present
and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.
125 U.S. at 205.
26. 498 Pa. at 273, 445 A.2d at 1197. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980) (Court upheld a statute prohibiting plaintiff from excluding petitioning);
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (Court upheld a statute which authorized the
setting of a minimum price for milk); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (uphold-
ing an ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks in a residential area despite the fact
the land was worthless as a residential area and extremely valuable as a brickyard); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (Court upheld a statute that put liquor dealers out of
1140
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public to regulate private property rights for the good of the com-
munity is as essential as those private property rights themselves."
The majority also noted that the police power is as broad and com-
prehensive as the demands of society require.28 The majority noted
that any excercise of the state's police power conforms to the con-
stitutional due process requirement so long as it is not unreasona-
ble, arbitrary, or capricious, adding that there must be a real and
substantial relation between the desired goal and the means se-
lected to reach it.29 It is unquestionable, concluded the court, that
the means selected in the Code live up to the constitutional guar-
antees of due process because they sought to cure economic
harms. 0
The court noted decisions in other jurisdictions detailing the dis-
tribution of property at divorce, recognizing that this event creates
a need for financial assistance in the spouse with lesser resources.3"
The court recognized that the Code mandated that the marital
property not be distributed until the proper forum considered all
relevant factors32 and noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court
has pointed out that such distibution is required to be equitable in
nature. 3 In line with the equitable nature of the distribution, the
business).
27. 498 Pa. at 233, 445 A.2d at 1197.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 234, 445 A.2d at 1197.
31. Id., 445 A.2d at 1198. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
32. Id. The factors enumerated were:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning
power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and
income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical,
retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a
party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of prop-
erty is to become effective.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
33. 498 Pa. at 234, 445 A.2d at 1198. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 230, 320
A.2d 496, 502 (1974).
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court noted that property excepted includes that sold in good faith
or property to the extent it has been encumbered in good faith for
value.3 4 The factors to be considered in equitable distribution must
be relevant to each particular case and a court must provide its
basis for its order.35 In this way, the process of decision making is
enhanced and appellate review of decisions is aided, said the
court.3 6 The provisions of the new Divorce Code, concluded Justice
Roberts, guarantee that the equitable distribution of marital prop-
erty is granted only in instances where it is justified by the facts of
the particular case, and then, only in such a way as is justifiable.3 7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix maintained that the major-
ity erred in finding that the legislature intended the Divorce
Code's provision for equitable distribution applicable to property
acquired before the act's effective date. 8 Justice Nix relied on
Pennsylvania statutory interpretation legislation," pointing out
that a determination that a statute should be applied retroactively
must be accompanied by a requisite finding that the legislature
clearly intended such an application in the language of some par-
ticular provision.' 0 Justice Nix considered the provisions at issue
here neutral in that respect, accusing the majority of grounding its
determination on this point on nothing more than the justices' per-
sonal "social philosophy.""'
He also pointed out that according to statute and case law, no
legislation should be construed by the court in such a way that it is
found repugnant to the constitution.2 Justice Nix considered the
34. 498 Pa. at 234, 445 A.2d at 1198. See supra note 6.
35. Id. at 235, 445 A.2d at 1198. The Divorce Code provides that "[i]n an order made
under this chapter for the distribution of property the court shall set forth the reason or
reasons for the distribution ordered." 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 404 (Purdon Supp. 1982-
1983).
36. 498 Pa. at 235, 445 A.2d at 1198. The court in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa.
115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977) noted that such a statute acts as an aid for "appellate courts to
ascertain whether the sentence imposed was based upon accurate, sufficient and proper in-
formation." Id. at 131, 377 A.2d at 148.
37. 498 Pa. at 235, 445 A.2d at 1198.
38. Id. at 236, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
39. The provision states that "[n]o statute shall [be] construed to be retroactive unless
clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1926
(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
40. 498 Pa. at 236, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. The statute mandates that "[i]n ascertaining the intention of the General As-
sembly. . . the following presumptions.. . may be used:. . .(3) That the General Assem-
bly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Common-
wealth." 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1922(3) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). See also Wajert v.
1142 Vol. 21:1137
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provision relating to equitable distribution of property to be un-
constitutional as retroactively applied, relying first on the Declara-
tion of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution, which defined
property ownership as an inherent and indefeasible right.43 He
then noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously
dismissed the notion that the legislature could take property from
a citizen,"" but conceded the fact that there are circumstances by
which the public may regulate property rights for the common
good, cautioning that such regulation must conform with constitu-
tional due process.
45
In light of the majority's reliance on the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncement that the legislature has broad control over
the marital relationship, Justice Nix noted that that same court
later limited such control when private and personal rights are im-
pinged. 4' The end reached by the majority, Justice Nix implied,
may be justified and desirable, but there are other alternatives
available to the legislature to solve any social or economic
problems brought on by divorce, including alimony, support and
maintenance, along with legislation similar to the Code, which,
State Ethics Comm'n, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980) (court held unconstitutional a stat-
ute restricting a retired judge's right to practice before the court from which he retired);
Commonwealth ex rel. Dermendzin v. Myers, 397 Pa. 607, 156 A.2d 804 (1959) (court con-
strued a statute as impliedly mandating adequate notice and hearing before a second-of-
fender can be sentenced to an enlarged term to avoid due process questions); and Tremont
Twp. School Dist. v. Anthracite Coal Co., 364 Pa. 591, 73 A.2d 670 (1950) (court held that a
new statute could not affect old claims unless a reasonable period elapsed between effective
date and filing to avoid due process problem).
43. 498 Pa. at 237, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting). The Declaration of Rights
provides that residents of Pennsylvania "have certain inherent and indefeasible rights,
among which are those ...of acquiring, possessing and protecting property. PA.
CONST. art. I.
44. 498 Pa. at 237, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting). See Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa.
256 (1851), in which the court noted:
If the legislature possessed an irresponsible power over every man's private estate
: . , all inducement to acquisition ...would be removed. . . .If the government is
interdicted from taking private property even for public use without just compensa-
tion, how can the legislature take it from one [person] and dispose of it as they think
fit."
Id. at 263-64.
45. 498 Pa. at 237, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
46. Id. citing Baker's Ex'rs. v. Kilgore, 145 U.S. 487 (1892). That case involved the
property rights in three heifers and one steer, upon which a lien was placed when a judg-
ment was obtained against a husband though his wife claimed them as her own. A statute
was passed after the wife acquired title giving an interest to the husband, but the Court said
the legislature could only affect property rights in a prospective manner, only "by such leg-
islation as does not violate those fundamental principles which have been established for the
protection of private and personal rights against illegal interference." 145 U.S. at 491.
1983 1143
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however, would provide common ownership only for property ac-
quired after the statute's effective date.
4 7
Despite the fact that the purposes of the Code are praiseworthy,-
emphasized Justice Nix, the means used to achieve the end are
most decidedly unconstitutional.4" Justice Nix recognized that the
marital relationship is voluntary, and accordingly, each spouse
knows the consequences when entering the relationship. 49 The ret-
roactive application of the statute, however, is involuntary in its
application and deprives one of the parties of his property rights
without due process of law."
Justice Flaherty, in another dissenting opinion,5' examined the
Code provisions dealing with distribution of property on divorce 2
and decided that by giving the Code a retroactive rather than a
prospective effect, the vested property rights of one spouse could
be taken away completely and given to the marital partner despite
the fact that a piece of property is individually owned, according to
section 401(f). 5 The same result would occur if the property inter-
est was that of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety.4 Thus,
wrote Justice Flaherty, expectations of spouses relying on the pre-
Code laws to protect their property interests would be
disappointed."
47. 498 Pa. at 237-38, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 238, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
49. Id., 445 A.2d at 1199-1200 (Nix, J., dissenting).
50. Id., 445 A.2d at 1200.
51. Id. Justice Larsen joined in Justice Flaherty's opinion.
52. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d)-(f) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) which
provides:
(d) In a proceeding for a divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of
either party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the
parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems
just after considering all relevant factors ....
(e) For purposes of this chapter only, "marital property" means all property ac-
quired by either party during the marriage ....
(f) All property, whether real or personal, acquired by either party during the
marriage is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held indi-
vidually or by the parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, ten-
ancy in common or tenancy by the entirety. The presumption of marital property is
overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsec-
tion (e).
Id. See supra notes 6 & 32.
53. 498 Pa. at 240, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). See supra note 52.
54. Id., 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
55. Id. Justice Flaherty, however, cited DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d
174 (1975), in which a husband's expectations were most decidedly disappointed. In
DiFlorido, the trial court divided the household goods under the existing presumption that
the purchaser was the owner, with the other party having the burden to show a gift to the
1144
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Justice Flaherty stressed that Willcox rendered a retrospective
application of the equitable distribution provisions constitutionally
void.6 He emphasized that the legislature is presumed not to have
intended to enact unconstitutional legislation.87 He also noted the
principle that if it is possible to settle a controversy on non-consti-
tutional grounds, the constitutional issue should be set aside.5"
Justice Flaherty would have circumvented the constitutional ques-
tion raised with a finding that the Code was intended to act purely
prospectively."
Justice Flaherty then chastised the majority for confining its
search for legislative intent solely to the statute in question. 0 The
legislative directive, he continued, is that there is a presumption
against retroactive effect as provided in the statutory interpreta-
tion legislation. 61 Justice Flaherty's view is that little short of an
express authorization of retroactivity in the statute would suffice,"
especially when the statute deals with divesting property rights
vested before the statute takes effect.63 Since this was the case in
"marital unit." The property was found to be bought together, chosen together and in-
tended for mutual use. The supreme court agreed, discarding the presumption that non-
titled goods were the property of the husband. "[W]e now find the common law presump-
tion to be without any reasonable basis in fact." 459 Pa. at 648, 331 A.2d at 178. Also, in
light of the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, the court said it would "unhesitatingly
discard the one-sided presumption confronted today." Id. at 650-51, 331 A.2d at 179.
56. 498 Pa. at 240, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 241, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
58. Id. See Ballou v. State Ethics Comm'n, 496 Pa. 127, 436 A.2d 186 (1981). The
Ballou court stated; "[W]hen a case raises both constitutional and non-constitutional issues,
a court should not reach the constitutional issue if the case can properly be decided on non-
constitutional grounds." Id. at 129, 436 A.2d at 186. See also Mistis v. Steel City Piping Co.,
441 Pa. 339, 272 A.2d 883 (1971).
59. 498 Pa. at 241, 445 A.2d at 1201.
60. Id. at 241-42, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 242, 445 A.2d at 1201-02 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). See supra note 39.
62. Justice Flaherty noted Smith v. Fenner, 399 Pa. 633, 161 A.2d 150 (1960). In
Smith, the parties were involved in an auto accident thirteen months before passage of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Act of July 19, 1951, No. 248, 1951 Pa. Laws
1130 (currently codified at 12 PA. CoNs. STAT ANN. § 2082-2089 (Purdon 1982)). Eleven
months after its passage, the plaintiff, for consideration, granted a release to one of the
three defendants. Under the law before the act, the release would effectively release all
three. The court held the act applicable, not releasing the two defendants since, it said,
there was no vested right to be released from liability and their liability was not increased
due to the fact that any one of them may have been liable for all of the damages. The court
indicated that "statutes other than those affecting procedural matters must be construed
prospectively except where the legislative intent that they shall act retroactively is so clear
as to preclude all question as to the intention of the legislature." 399 Pa. at 640, 161 A.2d at
154.
63. 498 Pa. at 242, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Flaherty relied on Com-
monwealth ex rel. Greenawalt v. Greenawalt, 347 Pa. 510, 32 A.2d 757 (1943), in which the
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Bacchetta, added Flaherty, absent a clear authorization of retroac-
tivity, the provisions at issue must be construed as acting solely in
a prospective manner.64
The language of the statute is general, added Justice Flaherty, in
that it defines marital property as that acquired during the mar-
riage, but does not indicate whether property acquired before the
Code's effective date is to be included. 65 In such a case, he main-
tained, with the statute susceptible to both a prospective or retro-
active application, the statute should not be construed to affect
property rights vested prior to its passage, especially in light of the
absence of an express manifestation of retroactive intent.66
The construction guidelines of section 103, said Justice Flaherty,
simply provide that grounds for divorce arising before the Code
may constitute grounds for divorce under the Code.67 He consid-
ered the majority's application of this section to be overly broad in
that it deemed the property distribution provisions to be effective
not only regardless of when the cause for divorce arose, but also
without regard to when the property was acquired." Justice Fla-
herty noted that the legislature has directed that retroactive provi-
sions should be strictly construed rather than given a broad inter-
pretation.69 Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
previously pronounced that even when there are sufficient grounds
for a retroactive construction, the statute so deemed should be
strictly construed.7 0 There was no basis whatsoever, concluded Fla-
court held a statute authorizing the forced sale of entireties property to enforce payment of
an order for support of a wife or children to be prospective in operation. If the language is
general and susceptible to a prospective or retroactive construction, it must be considered
prospective, said the court, when it will "divest rights, particularly property rights, which
were vested anterior to the time of the enactment of such law." 347 Pa. at 512, 32 A.2d at
758.
64. 498 Pa. at 242, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 242-43, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 243, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. See also 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1928(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983), which
provides that retroactive provisions are to be strictly construed.
70. 498 Pa. at 243, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). See Commonwealth v.
Story, 497 Pa. 273, 440 A.2d 488 (1981). In Story, the defendant was convicted of first de-
gree murder in a 1974 killing and sentenced to death in 1975. While an appeal was pending,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the death penalty statute unconstitutional (in
1977). Subsequently, the court found that the conviction was improperly obtained and a
retrial was granted. In 1978, just before the start of the second trial, a new death penalty
statute was passed. Story was convicted and sentenced to death again, this time under the
1978 statute. The court distinguished Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), in which: (1)
the defendant committed the offense while an unconstitutional death penalty statute was in
1146 Vol. 21:1137
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herty, to find that the legislation was intended to affect property
acquired before the Code's effective date. 1
In 1785, the Pennsylvania legislature promulgated its first di-
vorce law. 72 This law remained virtually unchanged until the en-
actment of the present Divorce Code in 1980.78 The 1785 Act had
been amended with minor changes.74 It was finally codified in
1815'5 and was recodified in 192971 without major substantive
change.' The 1929 Code retained the standard features of the
1785 Act and remained in force until passage of the new Code.78
Before the enactment of the 1980 Code, Pennsylvania was essen-
tially a common law jurisdiction with regard to distribution of
property upon divorce.7 9 Under the common law, all property ac-
quired during the marriage or owned by either of the spouses was
awarded to the spouse who maintained the proper title.80 The com-
mon law presumption that household furnishings, along with other
non-titled property, were owned by the husband was in effect in
this state until 1975 when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
changed the presumption to favor the approach that non-titled
property is jointly owned regardless of who purchased the items.81
It was not, however, until the 1980 Code that sweeping changes
effect; (2) a new statute was passed, and (3) then the original trial began. Because Story was
tried and convicted under an unconstitutional statute, the sentence was set aside. The court
stated, "[e]ven where the General Assembly intends a retroactive construction, the statute is
to be 'strictly construed.'" 497 Pa. at 276 n.2, 440 A.2d at 489 n.2.
71. 498 Pa. at 243-44, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
72. See Lippincott, supra note 3, at 185. Following the English practice, divorce in the
American colonies fell within the exclusive power of the legislature to grant or refuse, ac-
cording to each particular case. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888).
73. See Lippincott, supra note 3, at 185.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Act of May 2, 1929, No. 430, 1929 Pa. Laws 1237 (repealed 1980).
77. See Lippincott, supra note 3, at 185.
78. Id. Prior to the new code, there were no provisions for equitable distribution of
property, no consent, or no-fault divorces and no provisions for alimony upon an absolute
divorce from the bonds of matrimony, save in the case of an insane spouse. An absolute
divorce could be had only upon one or more of eight grounds (impotence, bigamy, adultery,
desertion, cruel treatment, indignities, fraud or coercion, or conviction of a crime). See Act
of May 2, 1929, No. 430, 1929 Pa. Laws 1237 (repealed 1980).
79. Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 25 VML. L. REv.
617, 624 (1980).
80. Id. The only exception to the rule was if the non-titled party could prove fraud or
deceit, in which case a court might have imposed a constructive trust. Id.
81. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 649-50, 331 A.2d 174, 179 (1975). See supra
note 55. It was possible to overcome the presumption by sufficient evidence of ownership. In
re King's Estate, 387 Pa. 119, 127-28, 126 A.2d 463, 467 (1956).
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were made with regard to the state's divorce laws."2 The biggest
step taken by the legislature was revising the method applicable to
the distribution of marital property which was upheld by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Bacchetta, even when applied to
property obtained before the Code's effective date.
Equitable distribution provisions in other jurisdictions modeled
after or similar to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 3 have
encountered problems similar to those in Bacchetta where the ef-
fective date of the statute intervenes between the acquisition of
the property and the divorce proceeding. Essentially four different
approaches have been used to solve the problem - the public pol-
icy/police power argument advanced in Bacchetta 4" an interpreta-
tion that the statute really operates prospectively even though it
appears to act retroactively;85 application of the law as it was when
the property was acquired;s and simply disposing of the problem
by looking at the plain meaning of the statute and not reaching the
constitutional question. 7
The first approach, relying on the public policy argument, was
used in New Jersey in Rothman v. Rothman88 and in Illinois in
82. See Lippincott, supra note 3, at 186. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201(c)-
(d) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). A divorce can now be obtained .upon the consent of both
parties along with an allegation that the marriage is irretrievably broken, or upon consent of
one of the parties where the couple has lived separate and apart for at least three years. Id.
83. 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979).
84. 498 Pa. at 232-33, 445 A.2d at 1196-97. The notion of a state's police power gave
the Bacchetta court ample authority to support its holding that the state may, through a
valid exercise of this power, divest the husband of his property in favor of the other spouse
and comply with the due process requirements. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
declared previously, property rights are held by individuals subject to the regulation of the
state, DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971), Nolan v. Jones, 263 Pa. 124,
106 A. 235 (1919), necessary to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its
citizens, Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977). The
regulatory tool of the state is its police power, termed essential and the least limitable of all
the state's powers, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), restricted only in that it
cannot be used in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, and that there must be a reasona-
ble and substantial relation between the ultimate objective of the state action and the object
of that action. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). "[Tihe only limitation upon the power
was stated to be that the power could not be exerted arbitrarily or with unjust discrimina-
tion." Id. at 411. See also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). The scope of the power is
said to be as broad and as powerful as the changing social demands of society require. See
Barnes & Tucker, 472 Pa. at 126, 371 A.2d at 467.
85. See Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965);
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Fournier v. Fournier, 376
A.2d 100 (Me. 1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
86. See Jankowski v. Jankowski, 114 Ariz. 406, 561 P.2d 327 (1977).
87. See Morse v. Morse, 174 Mont. 541, 571 P.2d 1147 (1977).
88. 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
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Kujawinski v. Kujawinski. 9 Both courts mustered much of the
same argument as was used in Bacchetta regarding the police
power as a valid tool of the state in safeguarding the general wel-
fare, health, safety, and morals of the public.90 These courts
weighed the property interest that was impaired against the same
genuine interest of the state9 to arrive at the conclusion that the
statutes satisfy the constitutional mandate.
California,9 2 Maine,93 Illinois 4 and New Jerseya5 have put forth
what is perhaps the most interesting justification of the "retroac-
tive" application of the equitable distribution statutes. Their argu-
ment essentially recognizes that the statute does not attempt to
regulate property before its effective date. The words "marital
property" are not used until after the effective date when one of
the parties to the marriage begins the process by filing for divorce.
Thus, since the statute does not prevent a property owner's domin-
ion over the property in question until after the effective date, it is
operating prospectively.9 6 Maine's treatment of the matter is espe-
cially interesting. That court conceded that it would be unconstitu-
tional if the statute were applied retroactively to alter one's title in
property, citing Willcox to bolster that proposition, before advanc-
ing the contention that the statute is prospective only since it
neither prevents nor impairs either spouse from owning separate
property during the marriage - as long as they do not separate or
divorce.97
In Montana 8 and Arizona,99 courts were able to dispose of the
issue in a different and somewhat more straightforward manner.
Both parties in the Arizona case had stipulated that the new provi-
sions for divorce should be used in their action.' In most distribu-
89. 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
90. 71 Ill. 2d at 576, 376 N.E.2d at 1388; 65 N.J. at 225, 320 A.2d at 499.
91. The Illinois court mentioned the creation of an equitable system of property disso-
lution, and the fact that a prospective application would skip a generation and continue the
inequity sought to be eliminated, and would place an impracticable burden on the courts. 71
Ill. 2d at 576-77, 376 N.E.2d at 1388.
92. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
93. Fournier v. Fournier, 376 A.2d 100 (Me. 1977).
94. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d, 376 N.E. 2d 1382 (1978).
95. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
96. 62 Cal. 2d at 569. 399 P.2d at 904, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 104; 65 N.J. at 231-32, 320 A.2d
at 503; 71 Ill. 2d at 573, 376 N.E. 2d at 1386-87; 376 A.2d at 102. Illinois has since followed
Kujawinski in In re Marriage of Thornqvist, 79 Ill. App. 3d 791, 399 N.E. 2d 176 (1979).
97. 376 A.2d 100, 102 (Me. 1977).
98. Morse v. Morse, 174 Mont. 541, 571 P.2d 1147 (1977).
99. Jankowski v. Jankowski, 114 Ariz. 406, 561 P.2d 327 (1977).
100. 114 Ariz. at 407, 561 P.2d at 328.
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tion proceedings, it can be assumed that the new provisions would
only be requested by the non-titled spouse. On appeal of the prop-
erty settlement, however, the Arizona court looked to its own case
law10' and determined that it was bound to apply the law as it was
when each piece of property in question was acquired. 2
In Montana, the trial on property disposition was held prior to
the effective date of the equitable distribution statute, while the
trial court's issuance of its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
its decree were subsequent to that date.10 The court simply looked
to the wording of the statute and determined that the new statute
was applicable. 0 4 The court did note though, that the old law re-
garding equitable distribution was extremely similar to the new
law it refused to apply.'015
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has at least once before en-
countered a problem similar to that raised in Bacchetta in its 1947
Willcox decision. 10 6 The suit in Willcox was brought solely for the
purpose of obtaining a decision concerning the constitutional valid-
ity of the Community Property Law of 1947.107 The difference be-
tween the two statutes - the 1980 Divorce Code's equitable distri-
bution provisions and the Community Property Law of 1947 - is
minimal. 08 The Community Property Law of 1947 provided that
jointly owned property would consist only of that property ob-
101. The Arizona Court of Appeals had previously held that in a distribution action
filed after the applicable statute's effective date, it must nevertheless apply the law in effect
whenever the particular piece of property was obtained. Batesole v. Batesole, 24 Ariz. App.
83, 535 P.2d 1314 (1975).
102. 114 Ariz. at 407, 561 P.2d at 328.
103. The divorce was granted on October 23, 1974, while the trial was held December
9 and 10, 1975. The statute came into effect January 1, 1976, and the results of the trial
were announced on January 19, 1976. 174 Mont. at 542, 571 P.2d at 1148.
104. Id. The statute provided that "This act applies to all pending actions and pro-
ceedings commenced prior to its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment
has not been entered." § 48-341 (2), Revised Codes Montana (Smith Cum. Supp. 1977).
105. 174 Mont. at 543, 571 P.2d at 1148.
106. 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947).
107. In Wilcox, Justice Stern remarked, "[ilt may be proper to add that the suit is
obviously a friendly one among all the parties and that the transactions involved were en-
tered into only for the purpose of obtaining a judicial interpretation of the statute and a
decision as to its validity." Id. at 586, 55 A.2d at 524.
108. As interpreted by the Bacchetta court, the equitable distribution provision of the
Code deemed marital property all that acquired during the marriage, even that acquired
before the effective date of the Code. 498 Pa. at 230, 445 A.2d at 1195-96.
The Wilcox court held that property affected would only be that acquired both after
the marriage and the effective date of the Community Property Law of 1947, but the prob-
lem arose when it interpreted the act to affect earnings from property acquired before the
act's effective date and realized subsequently. See infra notes 117 and 128.
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tained both after the marriage and after the statute's effective
date. 10 9 The problem that arose in Willcox concerned the fact that
the court construed the statute to include earnings from property
owned by one spouse before the statute's effective date but realized
after both that date and the marriage as community property. 0.0
As interpreted by the Bacchetta court, the 1980 Code deems not
simply earnings, but the property itself acquired during the mar-
riage but before the effective date of the statute as marital
property."'
The husband in Willcox paid a premium on a life insurance pol-
icy obtained prior to the marriage with cash from three separate
sources: money earned after the statute's effective date from a
trust created before that same date; money earned as dividends
after the effective date from stock owned before the effective date,
and cash he owned before the effective date of the statute." 2 He
then transferred the policy to plaintiff Willcox, who shortly there-
after applied to the defendant insurance company for the issuance
of the paid-up policy.11 The company refused the request unless
the compliance of the policyholder's wife could be obtained since
it, having been notified of the source of the final premium pay-
ment, maintained that the wife may have an interest in the policy
under the Community Property Law of 1947.1"4
Because the Willcox court determined that the 1947 law consid-
ered all earnings realized after the statute's effective date commu-
nity property, without regard that the property in question was in-
dividually owned by one of the marital partners before the
effective date of the statute, the question there became, whether
the legislature could constitutionally bestow a one-half interest in
such earnings upon a spouse when the partner acquired and owned
the property individually before the statute came into effect." 5
The Willcox court felt it was clear that the legislature could not
109. According to the act:
All property acquired by either the husband or wife during marriage and after
the effective date of this act, except that which is the separate property of either, as
...defined [in §§ 1 and 2], shall be deemed the community or common property of
the husband and wife, and each shall be vested with an undivided one-half interest
therein.
Community Property Law of 1947, No. 550, § 3, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423.
110. 357 Pa. at 589, 55 A.2d at 525.
111. See supra note 108.
112. 357 Pa. at 585, 55 A.2d at 523.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 585-86, 55 A.2d at 524.
115. Id. at 590, 55 A.2d at 525-26.
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have performed this feat upon the property itself without violating
the constitution."' The court then stated that if the above was
true, the situation it was called on to decide, concerning earnings
from property owned before the statute, must be equally repug-
nant to the constitution."'
Aside from the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania,'1" the Willcox court relied on its prior pronounce-
ment that the legislature did not have an irresponsible power over
all private property, for if it did, all incentive to acquire such prop-
erty would disappear, especially when the property is taken with-
out compensation.' The Willcox court noted that the fact that
the property was taken not for public, but for private use, also
weighed in its decision.1
2 0
One argument posed to the Willcox court was that while the leg-
islature cannot take the property of one person and give it to an-
other, it is not so precluded from taking property rights from a
spouse and giving them to his mate.' The United States Supreme
Court supported that argument to an extent in Maynard v. Hill, 2
noting that the legislature has supreme control over the institution
of marriage because it is of the utmost importance to the morals of
civilization.I' s Maynard, however, spoke only of present and pro-
spective property rights with regard to marriage, a point empha-
sized by the Willcox court.1 24 In any event, the rationale in May-
nard was limited by the Supreme Court and so noted in Willcox," 5
116. Id. at 591, 55 A.2d at 526. The court stated that it was "clear, then, that had the
legislature attempted by the Community Property Law to transform property then owned
by either spouse from separate into Community Property, such a provision could not have
stood the test of constitutionality." Id.
117. Id. The court noted that there is not much value for an "owner to be allowed to
retain what would virtually be a mere nominal ownership, if he is compelled to surrender
the profits and income therefrom." Id.
118. See supra note 43.
119. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256, 263-64. (1851).
120. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 485-86. (1871).
121. 357 Pa. at 591-92, 55 A.2d at 526. It was said that "[a]n act of assembly which
operates retrospectively to take the property of John Doe and give it to Richard Roe, is
prohibited by the fundamental law." E.T. Fraim Lock Co. v. Shimer, 43 Pa. Super. 221, 94
A. 227 (1910). Willcox then faced the argument that an act of assembly "can take the prop-
erty of John Doe and give it to Mrs. John Doe, on the theory that the legislature has the
power to regulate and control the property rights of husband and wife inter se, unrestricted
by our Delcaration of Rights or the 14th Amendment." 357 Pa. at 592, 55 A.2d at 526 (em-
phasis of the court).
122. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
123. Id. at 205. See supra note 25.




in Baker's Executors v. Kilgore. 2  Legislation affecting property
rights in the marital relationship, said the Court in Baker, must
not violate principles established to protect property rights from
illegal interference. 27
The Willcox court expressly stated that the Community Prop-
erty Law of 1947 was unconstitutional in that it divested a spouse
of property acquired before the statute's effective date. 2 '
The Bacchetta court, at the very least, modified the express
holding in Willcox. The 1947 court could have refused to consider
the due process question had it so desired since it adjudged the
statute to be void for vagueness due to the fact that it was contra-
dictory in its terms so as to make it inoperative.12 9 It is interesting
to note that an examination of the two statutes alone would more
than likely lead to the conclusion that if either would be found
constitutionally valid, it would be the Community Property Law of
1947 rather than the recent equitable distribution provisions. Will-
cox concerned the divesture of mere earnings from property owned
by one spouse prior to the effective date of the statute, thus mak-
ing the statute unconstitutional.130 The question in Bacchetta was
taken one step farther. It arose over the divesture of the entire
title to property owned by one spouse prior to the effective date of
the statute and its transfer to the other spouse through the Di-
vorce Code. The Bacchetta court distinguished the two cases by
126. 145 U.S. 487 (1892). See supra note 46.
127. Id. at 491.
128. See supra note 117. The court was only dealing with the question of earnings
from property, but considered the loss of earnings no different from the loss of property.
129. The Community Property Law of 1947 gave the spouse the management and con-
trol of all property he or she would have retained ownership in had the law not been passed.
Community Property Law of 1947, No. 550, § 4, 1947 Pa. Laws 1423. At the same time, the
statute purported to give each spouse an undivided one-half interest in the same community
property. Id. § 3. While the community property states provide a remedy for a spouse whose
partner attempts to defeat the other's interest by disposing of the property, under the appli-
cable Pennsylvania law (Act of June 8, 1893, No. 284, 1893 Pa. Laws 344, amended by the
Act of Mar. 27, 1913, No. 18, 1913 Pa. Laws 14), a wife could not sue her husband nor could
a husband sue his wife save to protect separate property. 357 Pa. at 600, 55 A.2d at 530.
Thus, the court stated, the interest bestowed in property by the Community Property Law
of 1947, is one with:
[N]o practical means of protection, [and] is not a genuine right of property no matter
what name or alleged title of ownership may have been given it. It follows . . . that
the Community Property Law is not only "vague, indefinite and uncertain" but so
"incomplete, conflicting and inconsistent in its provisions" that it is incapable either
of rational interpretation or of judicial enforcement and ... must be held to be inop-
erative and void.
Id. at 601, 55 A.2d at 531.
130. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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looking at the objectives sought by the two enactments.131 While
the Community Property Law of 1947 sought to provide an income
tax break to Pennsylvania residents, the Divorce Code attempted
to correct the economic wrongs inflicted by the previous divorce
laws on the dependent spouse. " The Willcox court, however, did
not, at least on the surface, state that the purpose of the 1947 law
had anything to do with its finding of unconstitutionality. The
Bacchetta court, on the other hand, treated the distinction as a
problem in balancing the public policy that the dependent spouse,
who in most cases, contributed as much as the other to the marital
accumulation of property, " should not be left, after the divorce,
with no other alternative than public assistance.
1 34
Additionally, three of the Pennsylvania opinions the Willcox
court used to build its finding of unconstitutionality either con-
tained language that might tend to support the Bacchetta court's
public-good rationale, or can be seen as inapplicable to a Bacchet-
ta-type situation. In Ervine's Appeal,1'5 the court did maintain
that all incentive to acquire property would be removed if the leg-
islature had the power to take it away, as reported in Willcox, but
qualified this by emphasizing that government's main objectives
are the promotion of morals and the administration of justice." 6
The court in Palairet's Appeal'37 did state that the legislature can-
not transfer property from one man to another, but added that the
power of eminent domain, since it is for the public's safety and
advantage, overrides any private property rights.13 8 Durkin v.
Kingston Coal Co." 9 dealt with the taking of property, but the
taking was done through a statute which imposed liability, as was
required by the operative mining act, on a mine owner for the neg-
ligence of a foreman in "failing to inspect the locality of a cave-in
where the plaintiff's decedent died. " 0
The Bacchetta majority relied on Maynard, as did Willcox, in
recognizing that the legislature has a broad control over the vari-
ous incidents of the marital relationship. But it was only the dis-
131. 498 Pa. at 231-32, 445 A.2d at 1197.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 24.
134. 498 Pa. at 232, 445 A.2d at 1197.
135. 16 Pa. 256 (1851). See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. Id. at 263-64.
137. 67 Pa. 479 (1871).
138. Id. at 488.




sent of Justice Nix, along with the Willcox court, that noted that
the principle was limited to an extent by the subsequent decision
in Baker.'4 ' Neither the Bacchetta nor the Willcox courts men-
tioned the fact that Maynard itself, when taking notice of the leg-
islature's broad control over marriage, said that if a governmental
body would attempt to interfere with vested property rights, it
would be a different question altogether.
14 2
Both Bacchetta dissents run along the same lines, centering on
the fact that the statute should not be accorded a retroactive ef-
fect. Through the years, retroactive features in statutes have gen-
erally been given a hostile reception, " 3 but the due process clause
does not render a statute void simply because it is retroactive.
1 4 4
The three reasons most advanced for this hostility have been: that
one desires to arrange his own affairs with a knowledge or an ex-
pectation of the legal consequences,14 5 that retroactive statutes can
be passed by legislative bodies with the foreknowledge of exactly
who will benefit,'" and a tradition that while the decisions of a
court can apply to past actions, the job of the legislature is only to
state future law.4  The United States Supreme Court has taken
the approach that mitigating circumstances can exist which would
make retroactive legislation desirable.
4 8
Three factors for determining the validity of a statute which op-
erates retroactively are the nature of the public interest served,'4
the extent to which the statute changes rights held before the stat-
ute was enacted,5 0 and the very essence of the rights upon which
141. 498 Pa. at 237, 445 A.2d at 1199. See also supra notes 125-26 and accompanying
text.
142. 125 U.S. at 206. The Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is not perceived that any principle should prevent the legislature itself from in-
terfering, and putting an end to the relation in the interest of the parties as well as of
society. If the act declaring the divorce should attempt to interfere with the rights
of property vested in either party, a different question would be presented.
Id. (emphasis added).
143. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692 (1960).
144. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945). The due process clause
does not invalidate a statute merely because it has some retrospective operation, said the
Court, adding, "[w]hat it does forbid is the taking of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Id. at 315.
145. See Hochman, supra note 143, at 692.
146. Id. at 693.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 694.




the statute acts.'51 Justice Flaherty's dissent mentioned another:
the extent to which a party has changed his position in reliance
upon the law as it was before the retroactive application of the new
statute."5 2 Retroactive application has been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in cases where the property rights affected
were in areas traditionally subject to the regulation of the legisla-
ture, since a party is then presumably on notice that a shift in the
law can affect his rights and interests. 153
Justice Nix began his dissent with a finding that there was no
intent in the legislature that the statute should operate retroac-
tively."' Either way, he said, legislation should not be interpreted
so as to run afoul of the constitution and if the Code is adjudged
retroactive in this respect, it would necessarily be unconstitu-
tional.155 While the majority distinguished Willcox due to the aims
of the two statutes, " Justice Nix maintained that despite the
goals enunciated, a retroactive operation is unconstitutional, and
that there are other methods for the legislature to achieve the
same end without violating the constitution.
5 7
Justice Flaherty also concluded that a retroactive construction
would render the Code unconstitutional. 58 He would prefer that
the court follow the principle of avoiding the constitutional ques-
,tion if the case could be decided on a non-constitutional ground. "
Justice Flaherty's solution was his agreement with Justice Nix that
the legislature intended the equitable distribution provisions to act
purely prospectivly, since when a statute is susceptible of a finding
of retroactivity or prospectivity, the latter must be the result.60
Though Justice Nix briefly mentioned it, neither dissent con-
fronted the public policy/police power argument set forth by the
151. Id. at 717.
152. 498 Pa. at 240, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
153. See Hochman, supra note 143, at 700. The Supreme Court noted:
Contracts . . . cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress. Con-
tracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter
which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties
cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by
making contracts about them.
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935).
154. 498 Pa. at 236, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 231-32, 445 A.2d at 1197.
157. Id. at 237-38, 445 A.2d at 1199 (Nix, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 240, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 241, 445 A.2d at 1201 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 243, 445 A.2d at 1202 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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majority. However, this argument presents difficulties. Is the police
power really as broad as the demands of society, or is it necessarily
as broad as an appellate judge's perception of the demands of soci-
ety? Also, exactly what is the public policy? It would seem, how-
ever, that the Code itself answers these questions through section
102, defining the public policy and the demands of society, ex-
pressed through the General Assembly in conformity with the pur-
poses of the Code, as stated by the majority opinion. 61
The majority in Bacchetta looked to the legislature's right to
regulate all facets of the marital relationship, while the dissents
conceded this but noted that there is a certain sanctity of vested
property rights which must not and cannot be disturbed.
Which path then should the court take? It may be reasonable to
look at Bacchetta and similar cases applying equitable distribution
statutes as result-oriented. The result reached is certainly one that,
on the whole, society may see as desirable, that of righting the eco-
nomic wrongs that have long been inflicted on the dependent
spouse who contributes equally to the marriage but receives no
tangible return to fall back on once martial discord strikes.162 The
question, however, remains: once the result is ordained, which is
the best method of attaining it? If in fact these cases are result-
oriented, Willcox was certainly an almost insurmountable hurdle
to overcome. Of the two methods advanced by states with equita-
ble distribution provisions to bypass Wilcox, perhaps the public
policy/police power argument is the more acceptable.
The notion that the statutes distributing property are not retro-
active in their operation is for the most part a fiction. True, the
statutes do not act on property until one files for divorce after the
statutes' effective dates, but it cannot be ignored that a right in
property vested before those dates is ultimately affected. The ra-
tionale here may be similar to the fiction of a constructive trust or
that of constructive possession, utilized by courts to reach a desira-
ble, in fact the only reasonable, result. But it seems to stretch the
point a bit far to consider something constructively constitutional.
What is left then is the public policy/police power argument.
The police power principle was available to the Willcox court, but
the economic injustice rationale, at least to the extent it was pre-
sent in Bacchetta, was not. If the decisional process can be looked
at as a method of balancing the competing interests, it is not un-
161. See supra note 15.
162. See supra note 24.
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reasonable to consider the plight of a dependent spouse as enough
to tip the scales in favor of a finding of constitutionality. After al-
most two centuries with essentially the same laws governing di-
vorce, 6 ' the new Code demonstrates a preference by the legisla-
ture, and thus the citizenry, for greater concern with the economic
realities attendant upon a family breakup,1 64 and perhaps the
courts as a result are more susceptible to yielding to the competing
interests to fulfill the legislative preference.
Michael G. Winklmann
163. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 15.
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